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Introduction
The recent crisis has been the most severe to hit Korea in its thirty-five
year history of rapid economic development. It was triggered by the 
loss of the credibility of the Korean economy among international
investors following the earlier crises in south-east Asia. Foreign 
investment houses suddenly became reluctant to make new loans 
and sought to withdraw existing credit lines to Korean banks and
business firms. As a result, usable foreign exchange reserves were
severely depleted in a short period of time, bringing Korea to the brink
of insolvency.
However, at the root of the crisis lay more fundamental causes;
over-borrowing and over-investment by the corporate sector, impru-
dent provision of loans by financial institutions funded by short-term
borrowings in international markets, lack of transparency in the
accounting and management of corporate and financial institutions, etc.
These structural problems were dramatically laid bare amid a prolonged
economic slowdown coupled with the contagion effect of the south-east
Asian crisis. Thanks to the arrangement of a prompt rescue package from
the international community led by IMF and World Bank, and concerted
national efforts to recover from the crisis, the worst phase now appears
to be over. Usable foreign exchange reserves expanded from US$ 3.9
billion on 18 December 1997 to US$ 54.5 billion at end-March 1999.
This reflected the rapid improvement of the current account position,
restructuring of the maturity of external short-term borrowings of
domestic banks, and the successful issuance of government Foreign
Exchange Stabilisation Fund Bonds in the international market. As the
exchange rate of the Korean won stabilised, domestic interest rates,
which had risen swiftly to over 300/0 in terms of call rates, have eased
gradually to 40/0, well below their pre-crisis level.
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to go belly-up and further weaken the soundness of banks. Such a circle
once set in motion notably increases the cost of restructuring.
Secondly, the burden of fiscal support on taxpayers must be kept to
an absolute minimum. Financial institutions should only be supported
provided they mount a drive to cut costs and attract foreign investment
for recapitalisation.
Thirdly, to prevent moral hazard arising in the course of resolving
troubled banks, shareholders, employees and managerial staff should
share the pain and the responsibility.
Fourthly, bank restructuring should be implemented in line with
transparent and objective criteria to avoid the likelihood of subsequent
disputes.
Specific policy directions
Resolution of bad banks and reshaping the banking industry
Unless ailing financial institutions can be swiftly disentangled from sound
ones, confidence in the overall financial system will suffer severe damage,
and borrowing money abroad will remain difficult. Thus, top priority is
being placed on resolving the unsound financial institutions as promptly
as possible in accordance with internationally accepted standards, on
assisting the viable banks to raise their efficiency, and on easing the 
credit crunch.
Also, bank restructuring aims to induce the creation of leading banks
by mergers between large banks. This would, it is reasoned, enable them
to compete with large foreign banks on an equal footing and remove the
inefficiencies resulting from over-banking in this country.
After bank restructuring has been completed, the Korean banking
sector will take on a new shape. It will comprise three categories: leading
banks created through mergers between large banks, medium-sized
banks carrying out retail banking and providing housing finance in niche
markets, and small regional banks specialised in specific areas.
Making financial statements and prudential regulations more transparent
Many experts have pointed to a lack of transparency as one of the
primary factors in bringing about the crisis since it caused foreign
However, the real economy has been hit harder than expected 
due to the sharp reduction of investment and consumption demand.
Throughout 1998, real GDP was projected to contract by 5.80/0. In 
the aftermath of the crisis, the Korean government has been carrying 
out an extensive economic programme focused on macroeconomic
stability and structural reform of the financial, corporate and labour
sectors. Reform of the financial sector and banks in particular has 
been given top priority, and it is here that most success has been
achieved so far.
The financial sector restructuring is focused on compelling unsound
financial institutions to leave the market, resolving the overhang of 
bad loans, strengthening institutions’ capital base, and ensuring the
transparency of management. Although the ultimate goal is, of course, to
improve the overall efficiency of management and enhance competitive-
ness in the globalised market, it is vital for the real economy to recover
from its deep recession and move to a sustained growth track. A vicious
circle had been set in motion whereby a severe credit crunch associated
with financial restructuring brought about an even more acute business
slowdown. Banks avoided making fresh loans and sought to call in
existing credits, because those which failed to meet the BIS capital
adequacy guidelines might be forced to leave the market. This, in turn,
triggered increased corporate failures that tightened the credit crunch in
the financial markets.
This paper first looks into the explanations for the policy initiatives
taken. It then goes on to describe the tasks to be completed in the
course of financial restructuring.
Underlying principles of bank restructuring
Bank restructuring is being pursued in accordance with fundamental
principles as follows.
First, bank restructuring should be completed swiftly and thoroughly
to get the intermediation function of the financial markets working
properly again as soon as possible. The slower the restructuring process
proceeds, the longer and deeper will be the associated credit crunch.
Troubled banks will be reluctant to lend to firms due to their great
anxiety about creating additional bad loans. This, in turn, will lead firms
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Progress in restructuring
In close consultation with the IMF, the government is pressing ahead 
with the exit of nonviable banks. It is also helping the viable banks to
recapitalise and dispose of non-performing loans (NPLs) by injecting
public funds on the condition that they make every effort themselves to
rehabilitate by mergers, induction of foreign capital and improvement of
management.
In a further move to improve banking soundness and efficiency, a
systematic policy framework is being prepared. It will include the
adoption of prudential regulations in line with internationally accepted
standards, the tightening of internal control systems, and the adjustment
of restrictions on shareholdings in banks.
Restructuring of distressed banks
The government revoked the foreign exchange licenses of eight
merchant banks2 unable to meet their current liabilities at the time the
negotiations with the IMF began in November 1997. On 2 December
1997, business suspensions were imposed on nine merchant banks3
owing to their liquidity shortages, and then the suspension of an
additional five merchant banks4 was ordered on 10 December following
runs on them. In all, 18 merchant banks had their operations suspended,
and 16 of these have since had their licenses revoked. As a result, only
14 merchant banks were still operating by end-1998. Among these,
though, an additional two merchant banks5 had merged with commercial
banks while one merchant bank6 had been ordered to suspend business
in 1999. Four securities companies7 on the brink of insolvency had their
licenses revoked and one securities company8 was ordered to suspend
its business. In the case of investment trust companies, one company9
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investors to lose confidence in the Korean economy. The banking sector
has not been an exception to this pervasive opacity. Financial statements
of banks did not always reflect their status accurately because 
accounting standards (i.e. provisioning requirements) set by bank
regulators were adjusted almost every year.
To improve the credibility of bank financial statements, the account-
ing standards are now enforced in accordance with internationally
accepted standards by Financial Supervisory Service (FSS).1 Disclosure
requirements in relation to banks’ internal management have also been
strengthened. Prudential regulation standards that incorporate the “Basle
Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision” have been put in place.
Furthermore, forward-looking criteria for asset classification will be
introduced by end-1999.
Improving the efficiency of banks’ management
Banks in Korea had enjoyed a high level of government protection in
return for serving as the handmaidens of industrial policy during the
period of development finance. For too long, their lending decisions were
not based on strict analysis of the profitability of a firm’s investment
projects. Rather, in the case of big firms, banks showed a tendency to
lend money in the belief that these were too big to fail. In the case 
of small and medium-sized enterprises, lending decisions were based
mainly upon the collateral offered.
To transform banks into profit-seeking corporations operating on 
a commercial basis like other companies, the supervisory authority 
has introduced a scheme for them to improve their competitiveness 
by building up their credit-screening capacity and developing risk
management techniques and internal control systems.
If they are to become robust and strong players in the globalised
market, banks will also have to cut their branch networks and shed 
staff to enhance their productivity to the level of rivals from developed
countries.
1 The FSS was established on 1 January 1999 by combining four former supervisory 
bodies: the Banking Supervisory Authority, the Securities Supervisory Board, the Insurance
Supervisory Board, and the Non-bank Supervisory Authority.
2 Gyongnam, Samyang, Hangil, Coryo, Yeungnam, Daehan, Samsam, Kyungil (26 November
1997).
3 Samsam, Hansol, Gyongnam, Coryo, Hangdo, Ssangyong, Shinsegae, Chongsol, Kyungil 
(2 December 1997).
4 Daehan, Central Banking, Shinhan, Hanhwa, Nara (12 December 1997).
5 Korea International Merchant Bank (merged with KEB on 1 January 1999), Hyundai
(merged with Kangwon Bank on 9 February 1999).
6 Daehan (10 April 1999).
7 Coryo (5 December 1997), Dongsuh (2 December 1997), KLB Securities (15 March 1999),
Dongbang Peregrine Securities (9 April 1999).
8 KDB Securities (25 July 1998).
9 Sinseki Investment Trust (19 December 1997).
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was dissolved and another company,10 whose business was later taken
over by a healthier company, was ordered to suspend business
operations.
In this situation it was deemed advisable to liquidate the distressed
commercial banks and merchant banks as a first step in the process of
financial restructuring. The simultaneous closure of all the troubled
financial institutions would have such a large impact on the financial
markets that it would have generated serious systemic risk. In the case
of non-bank financial institutions such as securities, insurance and leasing
companies, the sequencing decided was that those companies facing
insolvency in the process of bank restructuring should be liquidated
forthwith. The remaining institutions would be encouraged to raise
additional capital from calls on major shareholders, and seek a manage-
ment turn-around through their own efforts. Where such attempts
proved futile, they would in turn be forced to leave the market.
The focus of this paper will now be placed on a description of the
process of resolving the distressed banks.
Nationalisation and sales to foreign bidders
The problems at Korea First Bank and Seoul Bank were the most severe
faced by any of the 26 commercial banks, and posed the greatest threat
to the financial system. As a first step, they were both directed in
December 1997 to carry out measures to improve their management.
In January 1998, these two banks were ordered to reduce their paid-
in capital from 820 billion won to 100 billion won in each case, meaning 
that existing shareholders had to bear part of the loss. After that,
both banks were nationalised through subscriptions of 1.5 trillion won 
to each of them by both the government and the Korean Deposit
Insurance Corporation (KDIC), bringing their capital to 1.6 trillion won
in each case.
The reason why public funds were used to rescue the two distressed
banks, rather than forcing their exit, was that if the two banks had been
liquidated, all remaining banks would have faced bank runs with severe
systemic risk for the financial industry. As Korea had no previous
experience of bank closure at that time, and the two banks had a 
11 The agreement that the two banks should be sold by 15 November 1998 could not be
kept in the absence of a suitable buyer and their sale was postponed to the end of January 1999.
12 The provisions of the Act Concerning Establishment of Financial Supervisory Organisa-
tions not being in effect in February 1998, the then Monetary Board of the Bank of Korea
ordered these measures.
13 Banks’ BIS capital adequacy ratio classifications at the end of 1997




Kookmin, Housing & Chohung, Commercial Bank Donghwa, Dongnam,
Commercial, Shinhan, of Korea, Hanil, Korea Daedong, Peace,
Koram, Hana, Boram, Daegu, Exchange Bank, Chungchong, Kangwon, Chungbuk
Pusan, Kwangjoo, Jeonbuk, Kyungki (6 banks) (6 banks)
Cheju, Kyongnam (12 banks)
very high profile, the prospect of a heavy run on banks was considered
very likely.
Meanwhile, it was agreed with the IMF that Korea First Bank and
Seoul Bank would be sold back to the private sector following their
recapitalisation by the government.11 A privatisation process committee
was therefore set up in March 1998 to handle this. Coopers & Lybrand
were selected as the accountants responsible for the due diligence
evaluation of the two banks’ assets, and Morgan Stanley was chosen as
lead manager of the sell-off.
The government signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU)
with Newbridge Capital Limited, a major US investment firm, on 31
December 1998 for the sale of Korea First Bank. An MOU was then
signed between the government and HSBC on 22 February 1999 for the
sale of Seoul Bank. Now due diligence on both banks is underway to
allow the conclusion of these agreements.
Exit
In February 1998, the then Monetary Board12 (renamed the Monetary
Policy Committee from 1 April 1998) issued orders or recommendations
for management improvement measures to the twelve commercial banks
(other than Korea First Bank and Seoul Bank) which had had BIS capital
adequacy ratios of less than 8% at end-1997.13 It required them to
present management rehabilitation plans, including capital enhancement,
by April 1998.
10 Hannam Investment Trust (14 August 1998).
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exercised has since been extended to one year. Also, to prevent a fall in
the BIS capital adequacy ratios of the acquiring banks, public funds were
subscribed in the form of government securities to make good any
decrease. Some of the bad loans on their own books were purchased by
KAMCO, at its standard discount to book value.
Upon completion of due diligence of the assets and liabilities of the
resolved banks on 19 September 1998, KAMCO purchased bad loans
with a book value of 4.16 trillion won on 28 September. The KDIC put
up the 5.78 trillion won by which the liabilities of the resolved banks
exceeded their assets on 29 September. The licenses of the resolved
banks were revoked on 30 September.
Meanwhile, an unexpected set-back occurred in the process of closing
down the five failed banks when union members at those banks refused
to attend their offices, changed computer passwords, and concealed
important computer manuals. Due to this situation, business at the
acquired banks was paralysed for about a week. Under a compromise
agreement worked out between labour and management, however, it 
was possible for business operations to be resumed on a normal basis.
Restructuring of viable banks
The remaining seven banks which had BIS capital adequacy ratios below
80/0 but were deemed to have the potential to stage a turnaround and
had had their turnaround plan conditionally approved were required 
to file implementation plans for management improvement with the FSC
by 31 July 1998. Items to be included were steps to strengthen their
business through increasing their capital, change of the management
team, and downsizing.
The FSC had a Review Team operating under the FSS, and consisting
of professors, accountants and financial experts, inspect and supplement
these implementation plans, before their finalisation on 15 September
1998.
Accordingly, the seven banks have been carrying out their rehabili-
tation plans through mergers, capital increase by inducement of foreign
capital, consolidations with subsidiaries, and partial limitation of their
banking business activities. The supervisory authority appraises their
progress in this regard, and where this is unsatisfactory, it may either
require them to change their management team or issue an order
150
The Financial Supervisory Commission (FSC), established on 1 April
1998, selected six domestic accounting firms associated with inter-
nationally recognised accountants. They had them inspect the assets and
liabilities of the twelve banks concerned and assess the viability and
feasibility of their management rehabilitation plans according to the
standards agreed with the World Bank.14
A Management Evaluation Committee, consisting of experts from 
the private sector, was then set up by the FSC on 20 June 1998, to
deliberate on the basis of the accountants’ assessment as to whether 
the rehabilitation plans should be approved.15
On 29 June 1998, and for the first time in the history of the 
modern Korean banking industry, the FSC decided to order the exit 
of five Korean banks (Daedong, Dongnam, Donghwa, Kyungki and
Chungchong) deemed by the committee to have little possibility of
rehabilitation. The resolution of these institutions was to be achieved
through a purchase and assumption formula, whereby each acquiring
bank (Kookmin, Housing & Commercial, Shinhan, Koram and Hana)
would purchase the sound assets and assume the liabilities of a
distressed bank. In accordance with this decision, the operations of the
five banks slated for exit were suspended and the green light was given
to preparations for their acquisition, including the winding-up of their
remaining affairs.
The acquiring banks were chosen on the basis of their having a BIS
capital adequacy ratio of more than 90/0 at end-1997. They are expected
to remain under stable management following their acquisition of the
distressed banks and to benefit from potential synergies.
To guard against the possible worsening of their asset quality by way
of the acquisition, the acquiring banks were granted put-back options
under which assets could be sold back to the Korea Asset Management
Corporation (KAMCO) within six months after acquisition if they
subsequently turned sour. The period within which this option can be
14 To evaluate the appropriateness of such matters as capital adequacy, plans to raise
additional capital, prudential classification of assets, plans for reducing non-performing assets,
plans for cutting costs, and plans for management improvement, etc.
15 So as to ensure the objectivity and professionalism of the evaluation, the Management
Evaluation Committee is made up of twelve members including accountants, lawyers, university
professors and researchers.
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By end-March 1999, NPLs with a book value of 11.4 trillion won had
been cleared from the books of those conditionally approved banks that
had actively pursued management rehabilitation plans and mergers. These
non-performing assets were acquired at a discount by KAMCO.
Mergers
The government has been encouraging mergers between banks that 
are both sound and of substantial size. Its objectives are to hone the
competitive edge of the Korean banking industry through economies 
of scale and remove the inefficiency caused by the presence of many
relatively small banks. Accordingly, in addition to the merger between 
the conditionally-approved Commercial Bank of Korea and Hanil Bank,
Hana Bank, which had a BIS capital adequacy ratio of more than 80/0 at
end-1997, merged with Boram Bank, while Kookmin Bank paired off with
Korea Long-Term Credit Bank.
Moreover, Chohung Bank is to merge with both Kangwon Bank,
which earlier amalgamated with Hyundai Merchant Bank after having
written down its capital to 25 billion won, the minimum capital for a local
bank to hold a bank license, and with Chungbuk Bank, which was
ordered by the FSC to write off its entire capital and to merge with
another entity.
The Korean government acted to improve the merging banks’ BIS
capital adequacy ratios through the injection of public funds, to avoid the
possible deterioration of their status. Where it was deemed necessary,
the conditions for their receipt of this assistance included the reduction
of their capital and moves to turn themselves around. On 14 September
1998 the amended Act Concerning the Structural Improvement of the
Financial Industry came into force, providing for the simplification of
merger procedures and tax incentives for mergers between financial
institutions.
Major elements of the act are that the FSC is given the right to 
order mergers of distressed financial institutions and that the Minister 
of Finance and Economy can, if need be, grant exemptions from the
corporation or personal income taxes payable on income arising from
the liquidation of a financial institution. He may similarly waive or reduce
acquisition or registration tax payable on real estate purchased in the
course of the merger.
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directing them to take measures to improve their management status
through, say, a merger with another bank.16
Capital increases and resolution of non-performing loans
The government recommended that the seven conditionally approved
banks increase their capital at their own initiative and take steps to
improve their management. In this context, it eased the limitations on
bank share holdings by non-residents through revision of the provisions
associated with the General Banking Act. They may now hold up to 100/0
of the overall equity of a bank without requiring the permission of the
FSC and can own stocks in excess of 250/0 or 330/0 of the total voting
stocks of a bank by obtaining approval from the FSC at each stage.
So far, Korea Exchange Bank (KEB), to whose capital Commerz Bank
of Germany contributed 350 billion won in July 1998 and an additional
260 billion won in April 1999, has achieved clearly demonstrable success.
KEB also merged with its subsidiary, Korea International Merchant Bank,
in January 1999.
To enhance their competitiveness, banks other than the seven
conditionally approved banks are also trying to attract foreign capital.
Shinhan Bank successfully issued Global Depository Receipts in the
overseas market in April 1999, while several other banks including
Kookmin Bank are planning to raise foreign capital in the foreseeable
future. Peace Bank increased its capital to 440 billion won after having
written down its capital in October 1998 to 10 billion won, the minimum
capital for a nationwide commercial bank to hold a bank license.
Banks Management Rehabilitation plans
CBK, Hanil Merger, capital reduction and injection of public funds by the
government
Chohung, KEB Raise capital by induction of foreign capital
Peace Withdrawal from international business and large-value loan
business over 5 billion won
Kangwon Capital increase and merger with a related company,
Hyundai Merchant Bank
Chungbuk Capital increase
16 Plans for management rehabilitation of seven conditionally approved banks
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Also, to encourage banks to strengthen their internal controls, a
system requiring the matching of the raising and operation of foreign
capital by maturity19 was introduced in July 1998. Derivatives contracts
amounting to more than 50/0 of a bank’s equity capital can be entered
into only after screening by its risk management committee. Banks’ 
plans for rehabilitation must include arrangements to maintain capital
adequacy, and measures to strengthen credit analysis and ex post facto
credit administration.
In January 1998, to improve the internal governance structure of
banks, the General Banking Act was amended. The supervisory authorities
are now able to carry out fit-and-proper tests of major shareholders and
senior management by inspecting the adequacy of the composition of
shareholders, the source of funds used in the acquisition of stocks, and
the integrity and the suitability of the management team. After also
amending the Act Concerning the Structural Improvement of the Financial
Industry, the government can now order the destruction of the equity of
shareholders deemed to bear responsibility for the insolvency of banks
which the government has recapitalised or decided to recapitalise.
In April 1998, the related legislation was amended to grant the FSC
the right to demand management changes, capital reduction, mergers,
business transfers and third party acquisitions in relation to banks whose
BIS capital adequacy ratios and management status evaluation results fall
below a certain level. In this context, on 28 June 1998, the FSC required
the seven conditionally approved banks to change their management
teams substantially by the appointment of outside directors including
foreign experts. The KEB subsequently appointed two non-resident
directors20 in July 1998 as part of its cooperation with Commerz Bank
of Germany. Other conditionally approved banks have also changed the
make-up and size of their boards.
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Improving related systems, such as prudential regulatory standards
The evaluation standard for marketable and investment securities held 
by banks was changed from the lower-of-cost-or-market method17 to 
the mark-to-market method. Likewise, since the semi-annual closing at
end-June 1998, full 1000/0 provisioning for loan-losses, retirements,
and valuation losses on securities investment must now be set aside
following the tightening of accounting standards for the closing of
accounts.18
In a further move, from July 1998 prudential regulation has been 
tightened by classifying loans in arrears for three months or more as
“substandard” instead of “precautionary”, and those in arrears for from
one month to three months as “precautionary” instead of “normal”
loans. Also, the required provisioning rate for precautionary credits was
raised from 10/0 to 20/0.
From 1999, banks are required to set aside provisions for losses 
from guarantees at the end of each fiscal year. The provisions of those
credits classified as substandard or lower are to be deducted from Tier
2 capital in calculating the BIS capital adequacy ratio, and asset quality
classification standards are to be introduced based on the assessed
future ability of borrowers to honour their obligations.
A bank’s large exposure limit on credit to a single borrower or a
single group, which is now 450/0 of its equity capital, will be reduced 
to 250/0 of its total capital for a single group, and to 200/0 for a single
borrower from 1 January 2000. The definition of large exposure for the
purposes of the ceiling limit on the sum of large exposures was changed
from 150/0 of equity to 100/0 thereof on 1 April 1999. This ceiling on the
sum of large exposures is currently set at five times total equity capital.
Moreover, the scope of large credits falling under this ceiling was
extended from loans and contingent liabilities to total credit which
includes commercial paper, corporate bonds, etc. The definition of capital
in the denominator was amended from equity capital to total (Tier 1 and
2) capital.
17 Whereby the value of a security is taken as the lower of the carrying value (or acquisi-
tion value) and the fair market value.
18 It applies from September 1998 for securities companies and from the fiscal year ending
March 1999 for merchant banks and insurance companies.
19 To prevent a shortage of foreign currency liquidity arising from the diversion of short-
term foreign borrowings to long-term applications, this system regulates the ratio (gap ratio)
between net assets arranged by term to total foreign assets, after the classification of foreign
assets and liabilities based on maturity.
As per term 0–7 days 7 days–1 month 1–3 months
Regulatory gap ratio 00/0 or more below –100/0 below –200/0
20 The General Banking Act was amended to allow the appointment of non-resident directors
of banks on 25 May 1998.
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Furthermore, to enhance corporate governance, the role of the
board of directors, a majority of which is now formed by outside
directors, has been strengthened so as to act as a major decision-maker
on bank strategy and risk management.
Fiscal support for financial restructuring
The most difficult problem in the process of financial sector restructur-
ing is how to raise the funds necessary for the restructuring programme.
In principle, financial restructuring should be funded by the financial
institutions themselves. However, given the very real possibility that
turmoil in the financial system could trigger an economy-wide crisis and
the great difficulty for the financial institutions themselves to raise funds
in the bearish stock and real-estate markets in 1998, the provision of
public funds to financial institutions was unavoidable.
Therefore, the government set up basic principles to improve the
efficiency of fiscal support and to avoid moral hazard arising within
financial institutions. Banks were required to downsize their staff and
branch operations, and to improve productivity and profitability. They
have also taken steps for self-rescue such as raising additional capital
from abroad. Losses due to management failure should be shared by
stockholders and the management team responsible by means of capital
reduction or replacement of management.
The government supplied public funds in sufficient quantity to ease
the credit crunch swiftly, and thereby to return banks to normal. To 
this end, it is raising a total amount of 64 trillion won22 to facilitate
financial sector restructuring, of which 32.5 trillion won is to be used 
to finance the purchase of NPLs, while 31.5 trillion won is to be spent
on recapitalisation, deposit payments, etc. The funds are being raised by
issuing bonds of the Non-performing Asset Management Fund (run by
KAMCO) and the Deposit Insurance Fund (run by the KDIC), both of
which are guaranteed by the government. To prevent possible side-effects
like a run-up in interest rates or crowding-out through their issue in the
market, the government either pays financial institutions for the purchase
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In February 1998, to activate the function of shareholders and
internal auditors in monitoring management status, the requirement
conditions for the exercise of minority shareholders’ right to initiate a
class action were eased.21 The listed financial institutions had to appoint
external auditors (accounting firms) at the request of the nomination
committee which consists of the internal auditor, the outside directors,
representatives of shareholders, and creditors.
The conditions for taking prompt corrective actions have been
clarified and made mandatory by linking them to the BIS capital adequacy
ratios in order to avoid possible bias on the part of regulators. The 
FSS intends to alter the components of the bank management status
evaluation system from CAMEL to CAMELS to incorporate market risk
assessment from 1999.
With a view to reducing moral hazard and improving customers’
discrimination among banks, the interim blanket guarantee of deposits
and interest payments introduced in the run-up to the financial crisis to
secure stability was removed by imposing maximum insurance limits. In
particular, only the principal of single deposits of more than 20 million
won per depositor made after 1 August 1998, are now guaranteed.
Improving the efficiency of bank management
To increase the efficiency of bank management through downsizing their
organisation and staff, which had been allowed to swell with little regard
for profitability, all conditionally approved banks shed more than 320/0 of
their workforce as of end-1997 under an agreement reached in talks with
labour in 1998. Some banks, notably Chohung and KEB, have reduced
their workforce further. They are also boldly downsizing their head
offices and branches, to improve productivity by reducing expenses.
In addition, much of the discretionary authority concerning loan
decision-making formerly given to presidents and branch managers has
been removed, and banks have now generally established credit appraisal
committees whose main function is to assess the status of potential
borrowers before providing any large-scale loans.
21 The equity ratios required for exercise of minority shareholders’ rights have been
lowered as follows:
– right to initiate class action: 1.00/0 to 0.050/0;
– right of claim for dismissal of directors and internal auditors: 1.00/0 to 0.050/0;
– right of inspection of accounting books: 30/0 to 10/0, etc.
22 This 64 trillion won (fiscal funds) for financial sector restructuring is equivalent to 150/0
of 1997 GDP.
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Recapitalisation support and loss compensation
Banks acquiring resolved banks or consolidating with other banks by
merger run the risk of a deterioration of their management status and
shrinkage of their banking activity. To prevent this, the government has
established a programme to inject public funds into the recapitalisation
of newly merged banks and make up the losses arising from the acquisi-
tion of resolved banks.
For banks acquiring resolved banks, the shortfall between the assets
and the liabilities of the acquired banks is to be fully made up by the
government, so as to prevent deterioration of their management status.
The government also injects sufficient capital into the acquiring banks to
prevent any decline in their BIS capital adequacy ratios. For new banks
created by mergers between troubled banks, capital would be injected 
to bring their BIS capital adequacy ratios up to 100/0. In the case of
mergers between sound and troubled banks, the new banks are to have
enough fresh capital pumped in to maintain the previous BIS capital
adequacy ratios of the sound banks.
By end-March 1999, the government had devoted a total of 23.6
trillion won to these purposes. Until August 1998, 8.1 trillion won had
already been spent for recapitalisation of two ailing commercial banks
(Korea First Bank and Seoul Bank), and for the repayment of deposits
with resolved merchant banks. The large remaining amount of 10 trillion
won was spent in the one month of September 1998 for the recapitali-
sation of several banks.
In the last quarter of 1998 and the first quarter of 1999, an additional
5.5 trillion won was used not only for the recapitalisation of a number
of banks including five acquiring banks but also for the redemption of
deposits held with mutual savings companies and credit unions whose
business had been suspended, the sixteen merchant banking corporations
that had left the market and newly-resolved non-bank institutions, etc.
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of NPLs directly with the bonds or participates in the equity of banks by
subscription of the bonds for their recapitalisation.23
Purchase of non-performing loans
To resolve the large amounts of NPLs held by financial institutions,
the government set up the Non-performing Asset Management Fund 
in KAMCO in November 1997. At this stage, KAMCO purchases NPLs
from financial institutions planning mergers or carrying out self-rehabili-
tation plans.
By end-March 1999, KAMCO had purchased at a discount 44 trillion
won (book value) of NPLs for a total of 20 trillion won, paying directly
with Non-performing Asset Management Fund Bonds. Currently,
KAMCO pays 450/0 of the appraisal value of collateral in the case of
collateralised loans, while it pays just 30/0 of the value in the case of
uncollateralised loans.
As KAMCO will purchase additional NPLs that arise during 1999, it 
is anticipated that Korean banks will become ‘clean banks’ with balance
sheets as healthy as banks in advanced countries.
To date, the disposal by KAMCO of its acquired non-performing
assets has reached about 2.4 trillion won, with proceeds standing at 
1.1 trillion won at end-March 1999.
Schedule for KAMCO’s purchase of NPLs
In trillions of won
Nov. 97– Oct. 98– From Total
Sept. 981 Mar. 992 April 993
NPLs 39 5 32–42 76–86
Purchase price 17.8 2.2 12.5 32.5
1 30 commercial banks and specialised banks, 30 merchant banking corporations, and two
fidelity/surety insurance companies. 2 Specialised banks, some sound banks, merchant
banking corporations, securities companies,mutual savings companies. 3 Newly arising NPLs.
Schedule of fiscal support
In trillions of won
Jan. 98– Sept. 98 Oct. 98– From Total
Aug. 98 Mar. 99 April 99
8.1 10.0 5.5 7.9 31.5
23 In the case of purchasing NPLs, KAMCO makes direct payment in the form of its 
own bonds to financial institutions. However, for recapitalisation, the KDIC issues bonds
underwritten by the financial institutions which will be assisted, and then provides these funds
to the institutions to rebuild their capital.
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reviewing various packages of possible measures to recover the value 
of their loans to these firms. One of the major programmes is debt
restructuring through, for example, the conversion of short-term loans
into medium and long-term loans, the granting of a grace period on
servicing payments, reductions of interest payments, and debt for equity
swaps.
As of 2 March 1999, 83 corporations were in workout programmes
and among these 72 corporations had come up with feasible workout
schemes.
Strengthening management accountability at financial institutions
To prevent deterioration in the management status of financial institu-
tions, it is necessary that bank ownership system and governing structure
be improved so as to strengthen the management accountability of
financial institutions. As a part of such efforts, there have been debates
about such issues as the elimination or raising of the ceiling on stock
holdings of a bank.
Another important task is to strengthen market discipline exercised
by interested parties, such as shareholders and depositors, by providing
them with accurate and timely information about the management and
financial status of banks. The FSC has increased the frequency of regular
disclosure from once a year to twice a year (quarterly disclosure will be
recommended after the introduction of quarterly closing accounts from
September 1999) and has prepared sanctions against cases of misleading
or untruthful disclosure.
It has also increased the regular disclosure items to include all those
requested by the International Accounting Standard. These include risk
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Nor will this be the end. In the near future, additional fiscal funds will 
be needed to cover losses resulting from the sales of the government’s
stakes in Korea First Bank and Seoul Bank to foreign investors, and
exercise of the asset put-back option by the five banks which acquired
the resolved banks earlier.
Tasks to be completed
Major steps in the bank restructuring process appear to have been
completed successfully so far. However, the benefits of bank restructur-
ing will be increased provided a number of associated measures can also
be carried out without delay.
Accelerating corporate restructuring
At this stage, formerly ailing Korean banks have been converted to 
clean and healthy banks by eliminating NPLs and injecting new capital.
However, the delay in corporate sector restructuring may give rise to
additional NPLs. In the long run, it will reduce the benefits of banking
sector restructuring.
Therefore, in order for Korea to pull through its present difficulties
and regain a track of sustained economic growth, there seems to be no
alternative other than swift and intensive corporate restructuring, to
reduce credit risks and to eliminate the possibility of additional NPLs.
In this regard, the restructuring process in the top five interlinked
business groups, or chaebol, has already been given strong government
encouragement.
To restructure the top five chaebol in a more timely and effective
manner, they agreed with the government and major creditor banks 
to close nonviable affiliates, restructure business to focus on core
competencies, eliminate cross guarantees between companies within
each chaebol and substantially improve capital structure. Meanwhile,
the asset swaps and merging in seven industries, popularly known as 
‘big deals’, are now in their final stage.
Furthermore, workout programmes24 for weak but viable companies25
among the top sixth through sixty-fourth largest chaebol and other large
corporations, in terms of credit from the organised financial system,
are being put in place by the creditor financial institutions. They are
24 Each creditor bank set up its workout team on 20 June 1998. In addition, in order 
to ensure collaboration among creditor financial institutions regarding the assessment of
corporations’ viability and the method of providing financial assistance to them, a corporate
restructuring agreement was signed on 25 June 1998, by 33 financial institutions on behalf of
224 financial institutions. These  included banks, merchant banking corporations, insurance
companies, securities companies, and financial companies specialized in the loan business.
Creditor financial institutions have been selecting corporations for workout programmes
through negotiations with them.
25 In May–June 1998, creditor banks assessed the viability of a total of 313 corporations
including eleven emergency loan recipients and weak corporations affiliated with the top sixty-
four business groups. Based on this assessment, 55 companies classified as non-viable were
resolved by merger (eleven companies), sale to a third party (15 companies) and liquidation 
(25 companies) while four are in court receivership.
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high-risk assets, sustained by the belief that ‘financial institutions would
not be allowed to fail’. However, these recent exits have come as a
salutary warning to the contrary to the remaining financial institutions.
Financial institutions have been forced to desist from practices 
that involve moral hazard and must now operate their businesses in
accordance with market discipline, which requires transparent financial
statements and profit-oriented, sound and accountable management.
Provided that financial restructuring and a major part of corporate
restructuring are completed successfully, we expect the normal opera-
tion of the financial system to be resumed and a matching recovery of
confidence in the country on the part of international investors. Along
with this, domestic business and consumer confidence will pick up,
moving the Korean economy back onto a sustained growth track.
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management, off-balance sheet transactions including derivatives, asset
classification, and so on, and special disclosure items such as those
related to financial mishaps, the loss of a lawsuit for a large sum, etc.
In addition, it is also vital that a system that operates fully in
accordance with market principles should become firmly entrenched.
Financial institutions should make decisions on lending based on analysis
of the profitability of firms’ investment projects. The transparency of the
decision-making process will also make it clear where responsibility lies
for NPLs that arise in the future.
Toward a more competitive financial sector
While strengthening prudential regulation, the supervisory authority still
needs to ease restrictions on the range and methods of banking business
so as to afford banks more alternatives in their management strategies.
In line with this, measures are being sought to develop the Korean
financial industry to the level of developed countries by instilling greater
competitiveness into the financial sector. To make financial institutions
more competitive, it is an urgent task to establish firmly a general
practice of allowing market forces to resolve financial institutions lacking
the capacity to turn themselves around by their own efforts.
Conclusions
What lessons can Korea draw from its harsh economic ordeal? Perhaps
the most important is a renewed recognition of the significance of the
financial industry for the overall economy. In the process of pursuing
economic development from the 1960s, the basic functions of the
financial industry, such as credit screening, had been largely neglected
because the financial sector had been regarded simply as a means of
supporting the real sector. This eventually served to bring about the
recent crisis. When many large firms collapsed, financial institutions were
left with the problem of heavy bad loans on their hands.
Throughout the long haul of recovery from the crisis, non-viable
financial institutions have been leaving the market on an unprecedented
scale. It cannot be denied that Korean financial institutions had long
neglected sound management and invested recklessly in high-yielding but
